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We examine the magnitude and determinants of acquiring shareholder returns using a sample of domestic and foreign acquisitions of UK firms during the period 1990-1998.  We also assess the magnitude of combined wealth gains and their division using a paired sample of 219 targets and their acquirers.  Targets of foreign bids have a lower PE ratio, have experienced lower sales growth and lower profitability growth but have greater cash reserves and higher R&D intensity vis a vis targets of domestic bids.  Foreign acquirers are larger and have a higher level of intangible assets and R&D expenditure vis-à-vis UK bidders.  Both targets of foreign bids and their acquirers differ to their domestic counterparts in that they are from more high tech industries.
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As one of the most predominant forms of corporate restructuring, mergers and acquisition activity tends to occur in waves. Each merger movement has somewhat distinctive characteristics reflecting the dominant economic and technological factors operating during that particular period (Weston et al, 1998). 
The wave of the 1990s represents the fifth one of the 20th century.  It is also the largest based on the number of deals each year and the size of such transactions, (Hitt et al, 1998).  Acquisitions appear as the common solution in this era to forces driving global competition and industry consolidation.  Size was no longer deemed to be a barrier preventing a possible bid, (Aw & Chatterjee, 2000).  A significant feature of the 1990s surge in activity is that much of it has been transnational.  Reasons cited include the availability of new markets, opportunities to achieve production efficiencies or scarce specialised resources or as a means of reducing political risk.  An ever increasing emphasis on globalisation has stimulated the growth in cross border merger activity, (Hitt 2000).  By 2000 cross border deals accounted for over 80% of industrial countries FDI  (UNCTAD 2002) and growing at the expense of greenfield investment (Reuer et al 2004).  
A greater number of foreign bids along with first time exposure of deregulated industries to mergers are hallmarks of the UK takeover phenomena in the 1990s.  By 1998 cross border acquisitions accounted for 85% of the value of FDI inflow into the UK (World Investment Report (2000) with industry deregulation serving as a major influence on the level of acquisition activity, (Schoenberg & Reeves, 1999).  The UK market for corporate control is very active and transparent with public firms subject to takeover bids (e.g., Goergen & Renneboog, 2004; Markides and Ittner, 1994; Conn and Connell 1990).  This is partly due to the dispersed ownership structure of public firms (85% widely held), a well developed and liquid stock market, a high free float of shares and high disclosure standards (Mc Cahery & Reeneboog 2002).  The nature of the market for corporate control in the target county can impact on acquirer’s wealth, (e.g, Fatemi & Furtado, 1988; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Corhay & Rad 2000.  Compared to domestic M&A our understanding of cross border transactions for acquiring firms is limited and mixed.
Much emphasis in the international literature has focused on estimating the wealth effects for target shareholders and the rationale for differences in returns from domestic versus cross border transactions, (e.g, Tessema, 1985; Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991; Swenson, 1993; Dewenter, 1995; Chen and Chan 1995; Danbolt, 2004).  Studies of returns to acquiring firm shareholders in the international literature have mainly concentrated on overseas acquisitions (outward investment) only, (e.g., Fatemi and Furtado, 1988; Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Doukas, 1995; Datta & Puia, 1995; Danbolt, 1995; Eun et al., 1996; Corhay & Rad, 2000; Kiymaz & Mukherjee, 2000; Mc Gregory & Mc Corriston, 2005).  Fewer studies have explored the implications of cross border versus domestic acquisitions for acquirers and where they do substantial variation exists in the market for corporate control of target firms, (e.g., Cacki et al 1996; Aw & Chatterjee 2000; Lowinski et al 2004; Campa & Hernando 2004; Goergen & Renneboog 2004; Moeller & Schlingemann 2005; Conn et al 2005).  Two prior studies do examine returns to target and acquiring firms where targets are based in the same country (e.g., Kang, 1993 and Eckbo & Thornburn, 2000) but in each case the foreign acquirers are drawn from just one country, Japan and the US respectively.
The purpose of this study is to help bridge the gap by bringing new evidence to bear on the wealth effects for acquiring firms in the UK, including domestic and international acquirers, the latter drawn from a number of countries.  We estimate the short term wealth effects and the distribution of gains for a paired sample of 219 acquiring and target firms which is the first paper to do so and thereby contribute to the literature.  In addition we examine the role of bid characteristics and more target specific features in determining changes in acquiring shareholders wealth.  Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) call for the use of more firm level data when examining the effects of cross border mergers and acquisitions.  Our sample is based in data from 1990 to 1998 inclusive which saw a sharp drop in the volume and value of bids between 1991-1994 followed by a gradual rise in 1995 through to a merger boom in 1997-98.  Mulherin & Boone (2000) observe a similar pattern in the US where 33% of deals of the 1990s occurred between 1990-94 and 67% between 1995-1999.





The motives for acquirers engaging in merger and acquisitions are well documented in the domestic literature with the synergy motive associated with positive wealth effects for acquirers while zero/negative wealth effects said to be driven by hubris and/or managerialism (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993).  Synergy results when the value of the combined firm is greater than the sum of the acquirer and target as individual firms and can achieved from combining firms in the same industry sector (operational synergy), when firms have different financial resources (financial synergy) or different managerial resources (managerial synergy).  Hubris occurs when management in the acquiring firm make a mistake in estimating the value of the target leading them to overpay and a wealth transfer from acquiring to target shareholders as a result.  Managerialism arises when managers use acquisitions for their own motives of empire building and destroy their own shareholders wealth as a result.
These motives also extend to international mergers and acquisitions but there may also be additional forces in operation for this specific form of direct foreign investment (DFI).  Driving forces behind foreign takeovers are imperfections in factor and product markets, (Kindleberger, 1969; Caves, 1971; Hymer, 1976); imperfections and asymmetries in capital markets, (Froot & Stein, 1991) and differences in tax codes, (Scholes & Wolfson, 1990).  A firm’s decision to invest overseas is based on the theory that they can take advantage of mis-priced factors of production and at the same time overcome trade barriers.  The theory of DFI is based on the assumption that a firm must have firm-specific resources not available to local competitors.  The sources of such special advantage are intangible assets, technology and management skills with the assumption that product markets are not perfectly competitive, (e.g, Morck & Yeung,1992; Conn et al., 2005).  Alternatively, firms acquire overseas to transfer core competencies to new markets or obtain new resources and skills (e.g, Bartlett & Ghoshell,1989; Kobrin, 1991; Seth, 2000).  Furthermore, international takeovers can serve as a mechanism of international portfolio diversification for shareholders and as a means of reducing variation in earnings assuming earnings across markets are not perfectly correlated (Lessard, 1973). 

In summary, international mergers and acquisitions act as vehicles to bridge imperfections in factor, product and capital markets and can in the process result in value gains for acquirers.  Foreign exposure entails benefits and drawbacks in the form of different economic rents and risks, (e.g, Adler & Dumas, 1983; Fatemi, 1984).  The theory suggests acquiring firms are buying a ‘real’ option as to where to locate production.  Value creation will ensue for acquirers from gaining access to a new market and to a different stream of cash flows.  Furthermore acquirers may gain due to nature of the market for corporate control in the country of their targets (Goergen & Renneboog (2004)) or because are they are better equipped to solve target firms agency problems vis a vis domestic acquirers (e.g, Roe & Gilson, 1993; Seth,2000).





Traditionally cross border M&A research has been extracted from transaction cost economics and ownership location internalisation frameworks, (Shimizu et al (2004)).  More recently it has been extended to a resource based view and organisational learning perspectives (e.g., Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Madhok, 1997; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001).  The resource based view highlights the importance of value and heterogeneity in firms’ resources (Shimizu et al, 2004)
The empirical and theoretical literature on cross border studies is still its infancy (Bertrand & Zuniga, 2006).  Whilst a number of studies examine acquiring shareholders returns from international acquisitions these are largely conducted in isolation to domestic transactions.  Early research suggests positive announcement for US firms engaged in international acquisitions, (e.g., Fatemi, 1984; Doukas & Travlos,1988; Morck & Yeung, 1992; Markides & Ittner, 1994) and more recently by Seth et al (2000).  Fatemi (1984) and Doukas & Travlos (1988) establish that gains are significant only when firms acquire overseas for the first time while both Morck & Yeung (1992) and Markides & Ittner (1994) find support for forward internalisation in that returns stem from the intangible assets of the acquiring firm which are deemed exploitable in overseas markets.  In a similar vein, Eun et al (1996) establish that firms buying into the US gain, but returns vary across country of acquirer and the intangible assets of target firms have a significant impact on acquirers value gains, lending support for reverse internalisation theory.  UK evidence by Danbolt (1995) reveals positive but insignificant returns to overseas acquirers in the month of announcement with some evidence also of differences across country of acquirer.  More recently Corhay & Rad (2000) present weak evidence of gains to Dutch firms acquiring overseas with returns found to be greater when firms had less overseas exposure and when they diversified outside their core business.
In contrast, overseas acquisitions are found to have a negative impact on acquiring shareholders wealth and are documented in US studies of Fatemi & Furtado (1988), Mathur et al (1994), Datta & Puia (1995) and more recently by Kiymaz & Mukherjee (2000).  Similarly Conn & Connell (1990) document losses for UK and US firms engaged in international acquisitions while Gregory & Mc Corriston (2005) reach a similar result for UK acquirers both in the short and longer term.
More recent studies have conducted comparisons of value creation in domestic and international settings for acquirers.  These include US evidence of Cakici et al (1996) and Moeller & Schlingemann (2005), Japanese evidence of Kang (1993), Canadian evidence of Eckbo & Thorburn (2000), Swiss evidence of Lowinski et al (2004), Continental European evidence of Goergen & Renneboog (2004) and Campa and Hernando (2004) and UK evidence by Aw & Chatterjee (2000) and Conn et al (2005).  The results are mixed despite similarities in the time frames used to gauge the short term wealth effects around bid announcements with the exception of Aw & Chatterjee (2000) which is an ex-post study.  
Cakici et al (1996) find US firms lose when acquiring overseas in contrast to the gains for foreign firms acquiring in the US over the same period, 1983-1996.  Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) and Conn et al (2005) compare domestic to foreign takeover announcement effects for US and UK acquirers over a similar time span respectively, finding domestic announcements to be more wealth creating in contrast to foreign ones.  Likewise Campa & Hernando (2004) evidence for Continental European acquirers reaches a similar conclusion.  Eckbo & Thoburn’s (2000) study of domestic and international acquiring firm returns in the Canadian market also finds superior announcement returns for domestic firms vis a vis foreign firms.  In their ex-post study of UK firms Aw & Chatterjee (2000) also establish support for greater wealth effects for those acquiring domestically compare to those acquiring overseas.
Yet Lowinski et al (2004) report no differences in the returns to firms engaged in domestic and overseas acquisitions over the period 1990-2001, citing the extent of integration in the Swiss market for this.  In contrast, however Kang (1993) establishes greater gains for Japanese foreign acquirers into the US compared to domestic acquirers there while more recently Goergen & Renneboog (2004) find cross border acquisitions to be more wealth enhancing for Continental European acquiring firms than domestic transactions.
As cited previously almost all of these studies with the exception of Kang (1993) and Eckbo & Thorburn (2000) are conducted across different target markets.

In summary, the evidence on the wealth effects of international acquisitions for acquiring firm shareholders is inconclusive.  Exactly why acquirers lose from foreign takeover activity remains an unresolved issue.  Similar to Kang (1993) and Eckbo & Thorburn (2000) we undertake an international experiment of two different sets of bidders participating in the same market for corporate control.  We differ to both of them in that international acquirers in our sample are more geographically dispersed and are from different governance based systems.  Included in our sample are acquirers from market based and network based governance systems.  The UK, US and Australia can be deemed as market-based systems because of their well-developed financial markets, number of public companies, dispersed ownership and active takeover markets.  In contrast, network based systems are found more in Continental Europe and in Japan where there are fewer public companies, ownership is dominated and concentrated among families and banks, takeovers are less common and financial markets are less well developed (Corhay and Rad, 2000)

3. Research design and hypotheses:

The purpose of this paper is to threefold, namely to investigate the wealth effects for domestic and international acquirers engaged in takeovers in the UK market in the 1990s.  Secondly, we explore the division of gains between paired samples of acquiring and target firms using the approach of Eun et al (1996).  Finally, we investigate the determinants of acquiring shareholder returns in a cross sectional regression framework.
A number of hypotheses are developed to assess the wealth effects for acquiring shareholders and their determinants.  
Our first hypothesis is to test the role of country of acquirer on acquiring shareholders returns.  Returns to acquirers in foreign markets may vary to those generated in the domestic market due to the benefits/costs of geographical diversification that arise from cross border deals.  Cross border mergers enables the firms to expand its boundary (Conn et al., 2005).  If this form of diversification is of value to acquiring firms we would expect their announcement returns to exceed those of domestic acquirers, lending support for the multinational network theory.  The alternative hypothesis is that gains to domestic buyers exceed those of their foreign counterparts due to the cost of geographic diversification being outweighed by the benefits to the foreign buyer and/or due to information asymmetry problems experienced by the foreign acquirer.  Our foreign sample is sub-divided into three main regions, US/Canada, Continental Europe and Australian/Japan.  The justification for these groupings is that they have relatively similar markets for corporate control and trading patters with the UK. (exception is Australian/Japanese which is deemed too small to partition).
Geographical diversification may serve to enhance acquirers returns especially for those without a prior presence in the target’s country as it opens up a whole new market and network for them, (e.g., Fatemi and Furtado, 1988; Conray & Rad, 2000; Kiymaz & Mukherjee, 2000).  Alternatively acquirers with a previous presence are better informed about the target’s country and hence gain more than those without this presence.  For the foreign sub-sample we test if acquirers prior presence in the UK market has an effect on their announcement returns.  
The role of the exchange rates has been well documented in the international literature with acquirers said to gain the stronger their currency vis a vis their target resulting in lower financing costs for them, (e.g., Froot & Stein, 1991, Kang, 1993; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Conn et al., 2005).  Alternatively acquirers may lose the stronger their currency as the value of future repatriated profits will be lower (Cakici, 1996)  We test for the significance of the exchange rate on the wealth of foreign acquirers using a similar procedure to Harris & Ravenscraft (1991) and Kiymaz & Mukherjee (2000) to calculate exchange rate strength1. 
Much debate exists about the role of industrial diversification for acquiring firms with related acquisitions said to be more synergistic due to greater potential for economies of scale/scope and lower integration costs vis a vis unrelated deals.  Evidence in support of relatedness in both domestic literature include Morck et al (1988), Slusky & Caves (1991), and in the international literature by Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Markides & Ittner (1994), Goergen & Renneboog (2004) and Moeller & Schlingemann (2005).  In 
contrast Doukas & Travlos (1988) and Conrad & Rd (2000) find superior gains from product diversification by international acquirers. We test for the significance of acquiring and target firms being in the same industry sector using the 2 digit SIC codes to proxy for relatedness.
Returns to acquiring firms have been found to depend on specific resources of their targets.  Primarily examined in the domestic literature targets with a low market-to-book ratio are deemed undervalued and are more creating for acquirers as they are‘cheap’ buys, (Palepu 1986.  Superior management capabilities by the acquirer will result in positive returns for the acquirers, a form of managerial synergy.  We use three proxies to capture target firms performance, namely their market to book ratio and return on equity and their sales growth rate.  If the under-valuation hypothesis holds acquiring shareholder returns will be inversely related to these proxies of target firms prior performance.  Alternatively, if the market prefers stronger combinations of firms acquiring firms’ returns will be positively related to target firms recent performance.  
Target firms’ R&D investment has been found to yield synergistic benefit to acquirers in the international literature as acquirers can ‘internalise’ or deploy these valuable resources on a larger scale.  Known as backward or ‘reverse’ internalisation, support for this is found by Eun et al (1996).  However Cakici et al (1996) and Gregory & Mc Corriston (2005) find no support for this particular synergy source.  We test the significance of target R&D expenditure as a determinant of acquiring shareholders returns, both domestic and foreign using R&D/Sales expenditure as at the year end prior to the bid announcement.  We also control for industry sector as some industries will be more R&D intensive than others.  
We control for a number of variables including relative firm size, number of competing bids, form of payment and the period in which the bid was announced.
Greater gains have been found to accrue to acquirers the larger their target (e.g. Asquith et al, 1983; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989;Markides & Ittner, 1994; Danbolt, 1995).  The assertion is that large combinations facilitate the exploitation of selling company resources, consistent with the synergy motive for takeovers.  Such amalgamations result in revenue enhancement and cost savings via greater economies of scale in production, marketing and distribution.  Alternatively, large acquirers may overpay for smaller targets due to insignificant wealth effects for them (Loderner & Martin, 1990).  The presence of more than one bidder is referred to as competing or multiple bids.  Acquirers normally are assumed to lose from bidding contests, as they may have to increase their offer to secure control, (e.g, Bradley et al., 1988; Markides & Ittner, 1994).
Acquirers may use a variety of payment forms including cash, shares or a mixed payment form.  Empirical evidence suggests acquirers lose from share exchanges because it signals over valuation of acquirers stock or uncertainty over the true value of the target, (e.g., Conn & Nielsen, 1977; Bradley, 1980; Dodd, 1980; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Franks & Harris, 1989; Loughran & Vinjh, 1997; Walker 2000).  However foreign bids primarily are all cash, partly due to target shareholders reluctance to accept foreign equity (Gaughan, 2002).  Form of payment is often cited for the presence of a positive cross border effect for target shareholders.  




4.1 Sample selection and data sources
The sampling frame consists of bids by domestic and foreign firms for UK companies between 1st January 1990 and 31st December 1998.  The source for the sampling frame is Acquisitions Monthly/AMDATA. Bidding and target firms are publicly quoted companies.  
For inclusion in the sample transactions are required to fit the following criteria:
i.	The takeover bid is announced and completed within the 1st January 1990 and 31st December 1998 time span.
ii.	The bid is for a majority stake in the target firm.
iii.	Both target and buyer are listed on the London Stock Exchange or listed elsewhere, 
iv.	Accounting information, number of shares, capital changes, share prices and returns data for each company along with are available.
The sampling frame consists of 771 takeover bids over the nine year period, 476 domestic (62%) and 295 (38%) foreign announcements and these are shown in Table 1.  Between 1992 and the end of 1994 a marked decline in takeover activity occurred coinciding with the global recession.  A gradual recovery emerged in 1995 with a surge of bids arising in 1997.  Excluded from our sample are joint or partial bids, bids by Investment Trusts and bids involving companies for which there was no share price or financial performance data.  Results reported exclude takeover announcements involving financial firms due to their unique asset and trading structure, consistent with merger studies of Servaes (1991), Kang (1993) and Danbolt (1995).  Our final sample consists of 219 takeover announcements and the frequency distribution is presented in Table 2. 




An event study is employed to assess share price reaction around the time of a takeover bid.  Event studies have been extensively employed to analyse domestic and international acquisitions, (Servaes & Zenner (1994), Eckbo & Thornburn (2000), Corhay & Rad (2000), Goergen & Renneboog (2004)).   The market model has been used to compare the actual returns on a security against that expected if there had been no bid.  Under the assumption of multivariate normality, abnormal returns (prediction error) to security j on day t can be written as 
ARjt = Rjt – ( + jRmt)		
Where ARjt  = abnormal return to firm j on day t 
Rjt  = actual or realised return to security j on event day t
 +  jRmt = expected returns to security j on event day t
 = alpha and  = beta, the market model parameter estimates and 
Rmt = market return on event day t.
Estimates for  and  are calculated over the estimation period using OLS.  Values of  and  are estimated by regressing Rjt on Rmt.  The assumption is that the intercept and slope terms,  and , are constant over the time period during which the model is fitted to the available data. These coefficients represent the intercept and slope respectively of the market model regression.  This is run over a 200 day estimation period, from 250 trading days to 50 trading days prior to the initial event date t, the first date of the official bid announcement.  Mikkelson & Partch (1988) and Mc Willliams et al, (1999) adopt a similar estimation period.  Estimated parameters from the regression and the realised return on the market are used to forecast the firm’s expected return.  This is compared with actual returns achieved and the difference is classed as abnormal returns.
The mean Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) serve a measure of the total wealth effects of a takeover bid for each participating firm.  We derive CARs based on a short window of (-5,+5) days, similar to the US domestic study of Bradley, Desai & Kim (1988) and the international study of Eun et al (1996).  Tests of the statistical significance of abnormal returns for time t (for each day within the event period) are carried out with a Z statistic.  A Z statistic is derived following a similar procedure to Patell (1976) and Dodd (1980). Measures of CARt are independent, identically distributed and normal.  Adjustment for heteroskedasticity has been conducted here using the appropriate technique, consistent with White’s (1980) test for heteroskedasticity.  

In order to test for the division of gains we first calculate the total wealth gains using a paired sample of acquirers and their targets, similar to that applied by Bradley et al (1988) and Eun et al (1996).  Wealth gains (in £stg) are expressed in the following model:
WTi= WTi * CARTi and WBi * CARBi and WCi = WTi + WBi
where WTi = market value of target firm’s shares as at the end of 10 trading days prior to the first announcement, net of the value of the prior stakeholding held by the acquirer in the target.
CARTi = cumulative abnormal return to the target shareholders from five trading days prior to the announcement of the first bid through to five trading days after the announcement of the successful bid.
WBi  = market value of acquiring firm’s shares as at the end of 10 trading days prior to the first announcement,.
CARBi = cumulative abnormal return to the acquiring firm shareholders from five trading days prior to the announcement of the first bid made by this firm through to five trading days after the announcement of their successful bid.





5.1	Sample and bid descriptives
In this sample even though foreign bids come from 32 different countries, 88% of the volume and 92% of the value of all bids emerge from 10 countries.  Table 3 outlines the distribution of our sample while Table 4 lists this distribution over time.
Of the 11 countries featured in the sample these can be grouped into the following blocks: domestic (61.8%), US and Canada, (23.8%), European (12.3%) and Australian/Japan (2.7%).  Table 5 lists these and the average bid value across each region.  The mean bid value is £430m for domestic transactions, £390m for foreign deals with US/Canadian deals having the highest average value at £450m.  Relative firm size is approximately 43% on average as measured by the market value of target to bidder 3 months pre bid.
Table 6 contains the frequency distribution of the value of deals across different ranges from which the wide distribution in values is evident.  Up to 20% of all bids are for less than £20m, up to 37% feature in the £20-99m range with 16% exceeding £500m.  
Tables 7 and 8 reports the characteristics of the bids for the main sample and across country of acquirer respectively.  Approximately 81% of all bids are agreed with fewer hostile bids found across the foreign sub-sample (16.5%) compared to the domestic one (20.9%).  However there are variations across the latter as more US/Canadian bids are contested compared to the other two foreign regions. Bidding contests for target firms occur in 25% of cases on average with more depicted for the foreign sample, 28.2% v 23.1% for the domestic sample.  Acquirers from the US/Canada are more likely to encounter these bidding contests, 32.7% v 25.9% for Continental European and zero in the case of the Australian/Japanese sub-sample.  Bids are revised in approximately the same number of cases on average by acquirers in UK and overseas, slightly more in the case of the US/Canadian acquirers.  Cash only offers arise in 58% of deals on average but a significant difference is suggested between foreign and domestic deals with 95.3% of the former all cash offers compared to just 35% in the case of the latter, partly due to UK accounting standards (from 1970s to end of 1994) which encouraged equity financing as UK acquirers could write off the goodwill arising directly, (Gregory 2000).
Approximately 67.6% of firms operate in the same line of business, slightly more in the case of the UK than for the foreign sample, suggesting diversification is more prevalent among foreign firms.  However Continental European acquirers are deemed to engage in more related deals vis a vis their other foreign counterparts.  Finally, of the foreign sub-sample 65.9% are deemed to have a prior presence in the UK (form of a UK subsidiary) with firms from Continental Europe more likely to have a presence, compared to the Australian/Japanese sub-sample.
Further analysis of bid characteristics of the sub-sample of foreign firms in Table 8 shows how acquiring firms without a UK presence encounter more hostile bids, more bidding contests and engage in more bid revisions compared to those with a prior presence in the UK.  Finally firms without a presence engage in fewer related deals vis a vis those with a presence in the UK market.

5.2	Descriptives of financial characteristics of acquiring and target firms

The financial characteristics of the acquiring firms are presented in Table 9 across country of acquirer.  Foreign acquirers are larger than those from the UK with the largest coming from the US based on the Market Value of Equity 3 months prior to bid announcement.  Acquirers average sales growth has been 52% over the 3 years prior to the bid while their profit growth over the same period has been 54% on average, both figures depicted to be higher in the case of UK buyers with the difference in profit growth significantly higher (at the 0.10 level) for the UK sub-sample.  Yet foreign acquirers have on average a higher PE ratio, have more intangible assets and are more R&D intensive vis a vis the UK acquirers.  Both sets of firms hold similar stakes in target firms prior to the bid, 2.5% on average.
Target firms’ financial characteristics are presented in Tables 10 in which targets are depicted to be relatively similar in size across the different countries of their acquirers, the smallest being targets of firms without a previous UK presence.  Domestic targets have experienced both higher sales and higher profitability growth over the past 3 years compared to those acquired by foreign firms while targets of foreign bids have higher market to book ratios and more R&D intensive.  Finally, targets of acquirers without a prior UK presence are depicted to have had low sales and profit growth but are more R&D intensive compared to those targets whose acquirers have a previous presence.  However none of differences across the sub-samples are deemed statistically different from zero.




The industry sectors of the target and acquiring firms are shown in Tables 11 and 12 respectively with the classification of bids according to the FTSE industry sector shown in Table 13.  Similar to Markides & Ittner (1994) we find most firms are engaged in manufacturing.  Our evidence is also consistent with Powell & Yawson (2005) of industry clustering and of the forces of foreign competition in driving consolidation with the more merger active firms in this sample depicted to be engaged in electronic equipment manufacturing, engineering, food processing/wholesale and in broadcasting.  Whilst little differences exist across country of acquirer domestic targets are more prominent in broadcasting and food processing while foreign ones feature more in media agencies and the electricity sector.  Acquiring firms come from engineering, building and construction and diversified sectors with a greater number of domestic buyers engaged in publishing and food processing while more foreign acquirers are in diversified industries and in electrical equipment manufacturing.
Our evidence is consistent with Schoenberg & Reeves (1999) and Mulherin & Boone (2000) of deregulation having an influence on acquisition activity.  In addition up to 15% of all acquirers can be classified as high-tech2, with foreign acquirers more likely to be in high tech sectors compared to the domestic ones, consistent with Conn et al (2005).  Approximately 12.3% of targets can be classed as high tech, fewer in the case of domestic takeovers compared with those subject to foreign bids.  Finally Table 13 demonstrates how two sectors account for 75% of acquisitions on average, namely basic/general industrials and cyclical goods and services which are primarily in manufacturing.

6	Short term wealth effects for acquiring firms: Univariate analysis

In this section we present the results of the univariate analyses of the cumulative abnormal returns accruing to acquiring firm shareholders.  

Cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers across their country of origin
Results from Table 14 demonstrate that over the event period, (-5,+5) days, acquiring firms on average experience small and insignificant losses on average of – 0.243%, with just 43.1% undergoing positive wealth changes.  However there are considerable variations in the data ranging from a minimum of –41.56% to a maximum of 37.97%.  Foreign acquirers appear to lose more than their domestic counterparts, -1.048% on average v 0.288%, but neither are significant.  With fewer than 40% of foreign firms experiencing positive wealth changes the results suggests that such acquisitions destroy shareholder value.  Returns to acquirers do vary across the different regions with US/Canadian firms losing the most, -1.494% on average, compared to those in Continental Europe and the Japanese/Australian sub-samples, –0.333% and–0.286% respectively.  Using a similar 11 day window Bradley et al (1988) establish small but significant gains to domestic US acquirers of 0.97% on average with 47% of firms undergoing positive changes whilst Kang (1993) reports insignificant losses of –0.05% on average to Japanese firms acquiring in the US compared to losses of –0.06% to US acquirers in their home market.  Similarly Eun et al (1996) finds international acquirers into the US experience losses but similar to our evidence there is variation across acquiring countries with those from the UK losing the most compared to the gains of for the Japanese and Canadian acquirers.  More recently Campa & Hernando (2004) establish insignificant returns to Continental European acquirers engaged in cross border transactions while Goergen & Renneboog (2004) report small but positive and significant returns to foreign acquirers across Europe in comparison to their domestic counterparts.
Domestic firms in our sample are found to gain more than foreign acquirers consistent with Eckbo & Thorburn’s (2000) Canadian study and the ex-post study of Aw & Chatterjee (2000) of UK acquirers.  Information asymmetry is often cited for losses by foreign firms who are deemed to be at ‘an information disadvantage’ when acquiring in international markets compared to more locally based firms.  Yet we find weak evidence of acquirers with a prior UK presence experiencing greater losses those without a presence.


Cumulative abnormal returns to acquirers and their targets across sub-samples based on bid features.
Table 15 reports the results fore acquiring and target firms across the main sample and sub-samples.  Returns to acquirers are lower and significantly so when there are competing bids and when bids are revised (at the 0.10 level).  Similarly agreed bids, all cash offers as well as unrelated deals are more value creating for acquiring firms, albeit insignificantly so.  Finally, returns to foreign acquirers are depicted to be greater in the post 1995 era, the more merger intensive period and when their currency is weak but the differences are not statistically significant to the pre 1995 bids or when their currency is strong.
In sharp contrast to their acquirers targets shareholders exhibit strong and significantly positive returns of 27.58% on average for the main sample with targets of foreign bids deemed to gain more than their domestic counterparts but the difference is no statistically significant.  Some variation is presented across the different acquiring regions with those acquired by Japanese/Australian firms alleged to do best while those acquired by firms with a UK presence and with a strong exchange rate depicted to gain more than those whose acquirer has no prior presence or has a weak exchange rate.  Furthermore sellers gain significantly (at the 0.05 level) more when there is competition in the bidding process and bids are hostile while revised bids, all cash offers, unrelated deals, and those pre 1995 (albeit insignificantly) are seen as more wealth creating for target shareholders.  Finally, smaller target are shown to gain more and significantly so (at the 0.001 level) compared to larger ones.

Cumulative abnormal returns to acquirers across industry sectors.




Table 17 reports of our estimates of the wealth gains accruing to acquiring and target firm shareholders in as well as the combined gains.  The combined gain for the main sample of 219 deals is £2,767m on average and with up to 66.5% of combinations generating a positive gain this suggests that acquisitions of UK targets are on average value creating.  However, returns to targets and acquiring firms differ substantially as up to 97% of targets register positive returns in contrast to just 43.1% of acquirers.  Our evidence is consistent with Seth (2000) who found combined mean gains of $249.5m to US firms acquiring overseas with targets receiving most of the gains, 97% experiencing positive returns compared to just 54% of acquirers.






In this section cross sectional variations are presented to help explain the determinants of acquirers wealth.  To avoid possible heteroskedasticity, regressions are estimated using the standardised CARs. 
The initial focus is on explaining wealth changes by firstly considering bid characteristics followed by financial characteristics of the target firms and then country of acquirer.  Table 18 provides the definition of the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis.  Results (not reported) reveal low inter-correlations among the independent variables suggesting no multicollinearity problems.  Results of the OLS regressions are shown in Tables 19 for the main sample and in Tables 20 and 21 for the foreign and UK sub-samples respectively.  The first equation shows acquirers gain significantly when there is just one bidder, the lower target firms return on shareholders funds and their R&D intensity also; the former two significant at the five per cent level and the latter at ten per cent.  Domestic acquirers are depicted to gain more, albeit insignificantly so compared to foreign acquirers.  Once we control for country of acquirer relatedness becomes a significant determinant at the ten per cent level in the case of the US/Canadian, Continental European and Japanese/Australian acquirers suggesting overseas buyers gain significantly more when their UK target is in a different line of business to them.  The role for diversification however appears to be of little value to UK acquirers.  The country dummy reveals how US/Canadian acquirers lose in contrast to the positive returns depicted for Continental European and Japanese/Australian acquirers and the intercept is positive and significant (at 0.10 level) in the case the Continental European and Japanese/Australian acquirers.
Controlling for industry sector reveals no significant results per se with acquisitions in the two most popular sectors, basic/general industries and cyclical goods/services depicted to be loss making for acquiring firms while those in non-cyclical goods/services and in the utilities sector deemed to generate more positive, albeit insignificant returns.  The coefficient on the proxy for relatedness remains significant across all sectors except for basic/general industries, suggesting diversification is less important in this sector as an explanatory variable.  In summary the results from the main sample suggest returns to acquiring firms are driven by three variables.  Some support is shown for the role of target under-valuation in generating returns to acquirers, proxied by the return on shareholders funds with its negative and significant coefficient and to a lesser extent by the negative coefficient on target firms market to book ratio.  The positive but insignificant coefficient on target sales growth is not as hypothesised however.  The negative and significant association between targets R&D intensity and acquirers wealth persists with the introduction of country and industry dummies, suggesting targets with more R&D are more risky for acquirers.
Results for the foreign sub-sample are reported in Table 20 and we test for the significance, if any, of acquirer firms prior presence in the UK as well as the role of acquirers exchange rate strength.  Note however the small sample size limits both the number of independent variables included and our interpretation also (n=75).   Payment form is excluded as over 90% of foreign deals involve pure cash offers.  The intercept is positive but insignificant suggesting small insignificant returns to foreign acquirers.  Similar to the main sample returns are greater and significantly so (at the 0.05 level) the lower target firms return on shareholders equity and this remains robust throughout.  However whilst competing bids and more R&D intensive targets serve to lower acquiring firms returns as in the main sample the coefficients are insignificant for this foreign sub-sample.
Specific to foreign acquirers is the role of target firms sales growth rate with acquiring firms shown to gain and significantly more (at 0.05 level) the greater their targets growth in sales.  Whilst acquiring firms are deemed to gain more when they have not had a prior UK presence no major support is depicted for this variable or for the strength of their exchange rate in determining their returns.  Our evidence on the direction and insignificance of competing bid for foreign acquirers is consistent with Danbolt (1995) and Eun et al (1996) whilst that on the exchange rate effect is similar to Moeller & Schlingemann (2004).  Goergen & Renneboog (2004) also find an inverse association between acquirers returns and target firms return on shareholder funds, albeit insignificant, citing market concerns over the price paid for more profitable targets as the possible cause of this.

Table 20 contains the results for the UK sub-sample of acquiring firms (n=124).  The intercept is positive and significant is almost all of the equations in contrast to the foreign sub-sample.  The results mirror the main sample in that the significant determinants of acquiring shareholders wealth are the number of competing bids and target firms R&D intensity with acquirers said to lose from bidding contests and when targets are more R&D intensive.  However while the significance of the coefficient on R&D intensity is at the same level as in the main sample (0.10 level) that on multiple bids is less stable.  Payment form is depicted to play a significant role in this sub-sample with cash only bids deemed significantly more wealth creating for UK acquirers.  




Although an extensive literature exists on assessing the wealth effects of mergers most of it is from target shareholders perspective and concentrates on domestic studies.  In order to address the shortcomings in previous research, this paper provides an investigation of the magnitude and determinants of acquiring shareholders gains around bid announcement with acquirers from the UK, US/Canada, Continental Europe and Japan/Australia.  Acquiring shareholders are deemed to experience small and insignificant returns with returns to foreign acquirers lower than the domestic buyers, consistent with Eckbo & Thoburn (2000), Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) and Conn et al (2005).  Returns are shown to vary across country of acquirer, consistent with Eun et al (1996) with US/Canadian acquirers deemed to fare worst, in contrast to Danbolt (2004).  Combined gains are small but insignificant on average and with 65% of combinations resulting in positive wealth changes our results suggests weak evidence of UK acquisitions to be wealth creating for acquiring firms.  However whilst some support is presented to support the synergy motive on average this does not hold in the case of the US/Canadian sub-sample with just 36.5% of firms experiencing positive wealth changes.
Some statistical support is demonstrated for the role of bid and target firm characteristics in determining acquiring firms returns.  For the main sample competing bids, more profitable and more R&D intensive targets are shown to have a significant and adverse impact on buyers wealth.  These variables remain significant for the domestic sub-sample but in addition cash only bids are an important determinant of their wealth while foreign acquirers returns are shown to determined by the sales growth rate of target and their return on their shareholders funds.  We explore the distribution of industries subject to UK takeovers in the 1990s and concur with Powell and Yawson’s (2005) evidence of industry clustering and the influence of foreign competition on takeover activity in certain sectors.  Furthermore firms in the more recently deregulated electricity sector are popular with foreign acquirers.  
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Frequency distribution of bids for UK plcs by domestic and foreign firms 1990-1998 
(sampling frame).
















Frequency distribution of bids for UK plcs by domestic and foreign firms 1990-1998
 (main sample).























Distribution of bids across country of acquirer





































Table 5: Summary of regions of acquiring firms










Table 6: Frequency distribution of the purchase price of bids






















Table 7 : Bid Characteristics across country of acquirer
Mean 	Main sampleN=219	UK N=134	ForeignN=85	US/C N=52	CE N=27	J/AusN=6
Hostile bids (%)	19.2	20.9	16.5	19.2	14.8	0
Multiple bids placed (%)	25.1	23.1	28.2	32.7	25.9	0
No of bids revised (%)	20.1	20.1	20	23.1	18.5	100
Cash only deals (%)	58.4	35.1	95.3	94.2	96.3	100
Related (%)	67.6	69.4	64.7	63.5	70.4	50






Table 8  Bid Characteristics across presence of foreign acquirer in UK market at time of bid

Mean	Foreign-UK pres priorN=56	Foreign-No pres priorN=29	US with UK pres prior	US with no pres prior	CE with UK pres priorN=21	CE with no pres priorN=6
Hostile bids (%)	16.07	17.24(0.136)	18.18	21.05(0.248)	14.29	16.67(0.139)
Multiple bids placed (%)	21.43	41.38(1.843)*	24.24	47.37(1.652)*	19.05	50(1.288)
No of bids revised(%)	17.86	24.14(0.680)	21.21	26.32(0.413)	14.29	33.33(0.847)














Table 9: Financial characteristics of acquiring firms across country of acquirer

Acquiring firms- mean 	AllN=219	UK-N=134	ForeignN=85	US/CN=52	CEN=27	Japan/AustN=6
MV of equity 3 mon pre bid (£m)	2,681	1.524	4,505	5,823	2,803	1,247
3 yr. sales growth rate (%)	51.99	54.98	47.24	50.60	47.13	21.36































Table 10- Financial characteristics of target firms across country of acquirer 

Target firms- mean 	Main sampleN=219	UK-N=134	ForeignN=85	US/CN=52	CEN=27	Japan/AustN=6	Foreign—UK presN=56	Foreign-No presN=29
MV of equity acc yr end pre bid (£m)	262.9	296.9	209	187.2	261.7	153.4	228	172
MV of equity 3 mon pre bid (£m)	315.6	333.3	287	324	250.1	150.1	286	290
3 yr. sales growth rate (%)	28.60	30.01	26.33	26.12	26.7	26.59	28.78	21.9




Intangible assets/Total assets (%)	4.53	4.45	4.66	5.35	2.72	7.97	5.22	3.58
























Engineering companies- general 	5.9%	4.5%	8.2%
Food processors & wholesalers	4.1%	5.2%	2.4%
Broadcasting contractors	4.1%	6%	1.2%
Electrical equipment 	4.1%	5.2%	2.4%
Publishing, Newspapers and Printers	3.7%	3.7%	3.5%
Retailers- Hardlines.	3.7%	3.7%	3.5%
Electricity-generators- distributors	3.2%	1.5%	5.9%
Media Agencies (Advertising, PR)	2.7%	0.7%	5.9%
Packaging manufacturers	2.7%	3.7%	1.2%
Water companies	2.7%	3%	2.4%
Building and construction materials	2.7%	2.2%	3.5%




Education, Business Training & Employ	1.4%	0.7%	2.4%
Distributors-other	1.4%	0.7%	2.4%




















Building and construction materials	5.5%	5.2%	5.9%
Diversified Industries	4.6%	0.7%	10.6%








Biotechnology and drug manufacturing	1.8%	1.5%	2.4%
Retailers- hardlines	1.8%	3%	0%
Other construction (non residential)	1.8%	3%	0%
Restaurants, pubs, breweries	1.8%	3%	0%



















Table 13: Classification of bids according to FTSE Industry sectors*
	Main	Foreign	UK	US/Can	CE	Jap/Aust
Basic/General Industrials*	36.2%	39.3%	34.3%	41.2%	40.7%	16.7%
Cyclical goods or services**	38.8%	38.8%	38.8%	38.5%	29.6%	83.3%
Non-cyclical goods & services	14.6%	10.6%	17.2%	7.7%	18.5%	0%
Utilities 	6.4%	9.4%	4.5%	11.5%	7.4%	0%
Financial services and IT sector	4.1%	3.6%	4.5%	1.9%	7.4%	0%
* Basic industries sector consists of chemicals, construction and building materials, forestry and paper, steel and other metals while general industries consists of aerospace and defence, diversified industrials, electronic and electrical equipment, engineering and machinery. Cyclical goods sector includes automobiles, household good and textiles while cyclical services consists of distributors, general retailers, hotels and leisure, media, restaurants and pubs, support services and transport. Non-cyclical goods include beverages, food producers and processor, health, packaging, personal care and household products, pharmaceuticals and tobacco while non-cyclical services include food and drug retailers and telecommunication services.  Utilities include electricity, gas and water.  Financial services include banks, insurance and investment companies while IT includes hardware and software services

Table 14: CAR of acquiring firms (-5,+5) days
	Mean %	Median %	Minimum %	Maximun %	Std dev	% positive




Cont Europe only n=27	-0.333	-0.478	-20.6	32.77	9.10	38.5
Japanese/Australian only n=6	-0.286	-0.307	-5.400	3.953	3.54	50
Foreign and UK presence prior n=56	-1.419	-1.910	-21.38	17.40	7.17	38.2




Table 15: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) based on bid characteristics 
(t test in parenthesis)





Cont Europe only 	-0.333(-0.187)	25.6(7.159)***
Japanese/Australian only 	-0.286(-0.198)	33.79(2.243)*









Non revised bids 	0.598(-1.846)*	25.48***(0.843)
All cash bids 	0.220	28.40***
Mixed payment bids 	-0.918(0.812)	26.47***(0.621)
Related bids 	-0.606	26.26***
Unrelated bids 	0.486(0.747)	30.38***(1.259)
Bids post 1995 	-0.078	26.10***
Bids pre 1995 	-0.576(0.340)	30.58***(1.378)
Relative size < 50% 	-0.593	31.30***
Relative size > 50% 	0.945(0.937)	16.42***(5.259)***





Table 16: Wealth gains for sample of 219 paired UK targets and their acquirers during the period 1990-1998 and across industry sectors 
*,**,*** represents sig at 0.10, 0.005 and 0.01 level, respectively to all other firm types 

	CAR Bidder (-5,5)	CAR Target (-5,5)
Main sample (t test in parenthesis)	-0.243(-.354)	27.58(18.02)***
UK only 	0.288(0.316)	27.28(13.680)***
Foreign only 	-1.048(-1.007)	28.04(11.695)***
General industrials/basic industries 	-1.160(-0.928)	29.87(10.525)***
Cyclical goods or services	0.436(0.384)	25.78(10.780)***
Non-cyclical goods or services	0.751(0.566)	32.84(9.164)***
Utilities sector	0.033(0.013)	17.56(3.876)***
















Table 17: Wealth gains for sample of 219 paired UK targets and their acquirers during the period 1990-1998.


Mean gain of firms in £m, and % rets + in parenthesis	Acquirer’s mean gain	Target’s mean gain 	Combined gain 
Main sample 	-4,581 (43.1%)	7,348***(97%)	2,767 (66.5%)
UK only	422 (46.5%)	2631** (97.5%)	3,053 (72.9%)
Foreign only 	-4,,860 (38.1%)	7,201** (96.2%)	2,341 (57%)
US/Canadian only 	-5,210 (36.5%)	7,460*** (97.9)	2,250 (47.9%)
Cont Europe only 	-1,854 (38.5%)	11,700** (92%)	9,936* (68%)
Japanese/Australian only 	-2,480 (50%)	7,901 (100%)	5,421 (83.3%)
Foreign with UK presence 	-8,200 (38.2%)	8,672** (96%)	472 (58%)
























Table 18: Definitions of independent variables used in cross sectional regression models.  
Dependent variable is acquiring shareholder standardised cumulative abnormal returns for periods from 5 days before the initial acquisition announcement by the first bidder to five days after the last announcement by the successful bidder

MULTI	A dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if there are competing bids, zero otherwise
PAYMENT	A dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if all cash offer, zero otherwise
LNRLSZ	Natural logarithm of ratio of the relative Market Value of target equity to that of the acquirer, 3 months prior to the bid announcement.
RELATE	A dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if the acquirer and target are in same industries as measured by 2 digit SIC codes, zero otherwise
UKCNTRY	A dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if acquirer is from UK, zero otherwise
USCNTRY	A dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if acquirer is from US or Canada, zero otherwise
CECNTRY	A dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if acquirer is from Continental Europe, zero otherwise
JACNTRY	A dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if acquirer is from Japan or Australia, zero otherwise
PRIORP	A dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if foreign acquirer has a previous presence in the UK via a subsidiary, zero otherwise
EXCHR	A dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if acquirers exchange rate is strong, zero otherwise
MTBTG	Market to book ratio of target as at accounting year end prior to bid announcement
ROSFTG	Ratio of pre-tax profits to shareholders funds (%) of target at yr end prior to bid 
R&DTG	R%D/Sales ratio (%) of target as at accounting yr end prior to bid announcement
SLSTG	Sales growth rate of target (%) over the 3 years prior to the bid announcement
PRP95	A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the bid is announced in 1995-1998 era
BASICIN	A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the acquisition is in the basic/general industries sector
CYCLIN	A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the acquisition is in the cyclical goods/services sector
NCYCLIN	A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the acquisition is in the non-cyclical goods/services sector













































































Table 21:Cross-sectional regression estimates from regressing UK acquirers standardised cumulative abnormal returns on selected variables during the period 1990-1998 (t-statistics in parentheses)  *** Significant at 0.001, ** at 0.05 level, * at 0.10 level


Regression equations	1	2	3	4	5
Intercept	0.387(2.015)**	0.446(2.199)**	0.395 (1.941)*	0.375(1.558)	0.556(2.044)**
LNRLSIZE	0.048(0.743)	0.059(0.903)	0.100(1.455)	0.099(1.423)	0.109(1.558)
MULTI	-0.314(-1.469)	-0.394(-1.835)*	-0.432(-2.023)**	-0.424(-1.920)*	-0.467(-2.096)**
MTBTG	-0.008(-0.359)	-0.002(-0.091)	-0.005(-0.210)	-0.005(-0.208)	-0.005(-0.213)
ROSFTG	-0.015(-1.468)	-0.015(-1.391)	-0.014(-1.377)	-0.015(-1.375)	-0.015(-1.394)
R&DTG	-13.720(-1.793)*	-15.204(-1.880)*	-14.530(-1.811)*	-14.606(-1.809)*	-14.947(-1.857)*
SLSTG		-0.002(-0.814)	-0.001(-0.736)	-0.001(-0.706)	-0.001(-0.637)
PAYMENT			0.348(1.742)*	0.345(1.708)*	0.327(1.619)*
PRP95				0.030(0.155)	0.084(0.424)
RELATE					-0.265(-1.301)
N	124	117	117	117	117
Adjusted R2	0.028	0.036	0.054	0.045	0.052
F	1.712	1.732	1.945*	1.690*	1.700*
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